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INTRODUCTION: THE THIRD RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS IN A CRYSTAL BALL 
Michael D. Green† 
Restatements and Legal Change 
 We should feel obligated in our deliberations to give 
weight to all of the considerations that the courts, under a 
proper view of the judicial function, deem it right to 
weigh in theirs. (1967) 
 In judging what was right, a preponderating balance of 
authority would normally be given weight, as it no doubt 
would generally weight with courts, but it would not be 




The American Law Institute  
1963–1984 
 
My hat goes off to the editors of the William Mitchell Law 
Review for gathering a magnificent collection of articles about the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional 
Harm (2010) (Third Restatement)1 by an international group of 
 
       †  Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. Professor Green served 
as a co-reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm, along with Professor Gary Schwartz (now deceased) and 
President William C. Powers, Jr. 
  The text above appears on the wall of the conference room at the 
American Law Institute (ALI) in Philadelphia where meetings of the ALI council, 
advisers, and the members consultative groups are regularly held with reporters 
for the various ALI projects. 
 1. Unless otherwise made clear, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability 
for Physical and Emotional Harm will be referred to as the “Third Restatement.”  
The Third Restatement is being published in two volumes, the first in 2010 and 
the second, which is forthcoming, in 2012.  As those familiar with the process of 
replacing the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) are aware, the Third 
Restatement consists of various subject-specific projects, which include two already 
completed, Products Liability in 1998 and Apportionment of Liability in 2000.  
1
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994 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
accomplished torts scholars and practitioners.  This Issue and the 
corresponding Symposium reflect the breadth of the Third 
Restatement.  Initially subtitled “General Principles,” it was to cover 
the basic building blocks of tort law: the three bases for liability, 
intent, negligence, and strict liability, duty, factual causation, 
proximate cause, and affirmative duties.  But the Third 
Restatement covers considerably more, drilling down deep into the 
details of a negligence action and associated proof issues, 
including, for example, res ipsa loquitur.  It goes on to address 
three major areas in which modified duties have been adopted—
one for non-physical harms that consist solely of emotional 
disturbance, and the special cases of the effect of property 
ownership on duties owed to entrants on the land and those who 
hire independent contractors. Hence, the subtitle evolved to its 
current “Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,” as the scope 
of the project grew.  
Despite that breadth, I am not surprised that the contributions 
to this Issue cluster around three topics: factual causation, the 
general duty of reasonable care, and the special duty rules 
applicable to land possessors.  Those were three of the most 
contentious issues that the Third Restatement addressed and, after 
robust debate, these provisions were adopted by a majority vote, 
but, on at least one occasion, the outcome was in question until the 
Chair finished counting the show of hands. 
Ken Oliphant, a British legal scholar and Director of the 
Institute for European Tort Law in Vienna, Austria, dives right into 
an issue all legal systems confront—thin evidence of an element of 
a claim. Oliphant is interested in this problem in the context of 
factual causation.  Factual causation is a particularly interesting 
area in which to address the matter because, although factual 
causation is an objective, non-normative inquiry, the defendant(s)’s 
conduct may reflect quite a range of culpability, which may affect a 
court’s assessment of the evidence brought to bear on this issue.2 
Oliphant pursues the idea of proportional liability—imposing 
liability on an otherwise liable defendant based on the probability 
that the defendant’s tortious conduct was a cause of plaintiff’s 
harm.3  This is a subject that has received a great deal of scholarly 
 
Another piece is ongoing addressing economic loss. 
 2. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 66 
(1956). 
 3. Proportional liability, as discussed by Oliphant and this paper, is limited 
2
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2011] INTRODUCTION 995 
attention in the United States. It is also a hot topic in Europe where 
the European Centre on Tort and Insurance Law (“ECTIL”) is 
preparing a monograph on the subject.  
Oliphant’s survey of European systems’ approach to 
proportional liability reveals the wisdom of the American Law 
Institute (ALI) in reaching out to foreign legal scholars and lawyers 
to join the membership rolls and to become involved in the 
Institute’s work.  As a result of this program, the ALI now boasts 
torts scholars from England (Oliphant), Spain, Italy, and Israel.  
Even if the approach of civil law systems to these issues is not useful 
for adoption, their participation provides additional insight into 
the depth and breadth of these problems. 
Oliphant, fairly, inquires why the Third Restatement did not 
attend more aggressively to the scholarly advocacy on behalf of 
proportional liability.4  I don’t think it’s much of a secret that I am 
among a very small group of torts scholars who have been critical of 
the pro-proportional liability literature, especially in the toxic torts 
arena which has been the focus of most academic proponents in 
this country.5  The nub of my concern is that proportional liability 
is only attractive when, despite the lack of good evidence, the 
probability distribution based on the specific facts is limited.  Thus, 
if we know, in a given case, that the probability of factual causation 
is twenty percent, the case for awarding proportional damages is 
strong—much stronger than when all we know is that the 
probability is somewhere between zero and forty percent.6  I don’t 
believe that sort of evidence exists in toxic substances cases where 
 
to the matter of factual causation and does not address the more common 
apportionment of liability by relative fault as has become almost universal in the 
United States with the use of comparative fault or responsibility. 
 4. As I wrote in the United States Report for the publication on 
proportional liability now being prepared by ECTIL, “[s]cholarly use of 
‘proportional liability’ [reflects] a strong consensus in favor of a variety of reforms 
that would produce more proportional liability in a variety of . . . categories . . . .” 
See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts 
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); 
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” 
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Allen Rostron, Beyond Market 
Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability 
for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990). 
 5. See Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic 
Substances Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352 (Stuart Madden ed. 2005). 
 6. This is true whether we use ex ante contribution to the risk of harm or ex 
post probability of causing the harm. 
3
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courts have failed to heed scholars’ calls for employing 
proportional liability.  
Oliphant concludes with a wise assessment of the potential for 
comparative law: “Lawyers everywhere can learn useful lessons from 
the practical experiences of other jurisdictions in developing such 
approaches.”7  Oliphant’s survey of European treatment of 
proportional liability provides a compelling illustration of his 
dictum.  As I read Oliphant’s recounting of the Dutch and English 
acceptance of proportional liability, I realized that with asbestos 
litigation we have a ready, if modestly imperfect, source of evidence 
to ascertain the risk contribution of various sources of asbestos that 
might be used for a proportional liability scheme.  The length of 
time one was employed at a job site where asbestos fibers were 
released or contained in the air can be used as a reasonable 
approximation of the risk contribution to the victim’s asbestotic 
disease.  So, perhaps extension of proportional liability to asbestos 
litigation might make sense when non-tortious sources of asbestos 
exposure exist, as well as when competing causes, such as smoking 
in the case of lung cancer, exist.  Asbestos defendants should not 
bear liability for the risk contribution of these other sources of risk, 
and perhaps American law could learn from the English and Dutch 
approach, notwithstanding my general objection to the use of 
proportional liability.  
My tentative assessment of Oliphant’s comparative analysis was 
tempered, however, by consideration of an important caveat to the 
Oliphant evaluation of the benefit of comparative law: One must be 
careful about transporting the law from one jurisdiction to another 
because differences in legal systems may affect the suitability of 
importation.  In this case, asbestos litigation in both England and 
the Netherlands is against the victim’s employer.  In the United 
States, because we have workers’ compensation—the exclusive 
remedy for occupational injury and disease—tort claims arising 
from asbestos are instead against the supplier of asbestos or 
asbestos products.  Assessing the risk contribution of each supplier 
of asbestos products to a work site is far more complicated than 
counting days of exposure at a given place of employment.  One 
might have to consider a large array of factors—many of which 
would be difficult of ascertainment—to even begin to assess risk 
 
 7. Ken Oliphant, Uncertain Factual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some 
Comparative Notes, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1599 (2011). 
4
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contribution of a given defendant over many decades of 
occupational exposure.  
Thus, frequently asbestos plaintiffs are exposed to multiple 
entities’ asbestos products—often dozens8 and sometimes for very 
different lengths of time.9  But length of time exposed is not the 
same as dose, as some asbestos products are more friable, 
producing more respirable fibers than others in which the asbestos 
is encapsulated.10  The plaintiff may be in closer proximity to some 
defendants’ products than others at a given job site, especially at 
large and complex ones, thereby affecting the effective dose and 
risk contribution.  A debate continues to rage about the relative 
potency of different asbestos fibers in causing mesothelioma, which 
would be invoked if risk contribution were employed.11  Maybe 
proportional liability could be employed despite these obstacles, 
but operationalizing it in United States would be a great deal more 
difficult than in those jurisdictions in which employers are the 
responsible parties. 
There is another reason why the seeds for the development of 
proportional liability in England and the Netherlands have less 
potency in the United States.  With employers as the defendants, 
there may well be times of self-employment when exposures cannot 
be attributed to the tortious conduct of others, as was the case in 
Barker v. Corus (UK) plc,12 in England.  That is not the case in the 
United States where product suppliers are the defendants.  
Moreover, the problem of causal uncertainty—and it is substantial 
in asbestos despite the fact that agent-disease causation is 
straightforward for the three primary asbestotic diseases13—has 
 
 8. The Civil Justice Institute at Rand found that, in the early years of asbestos 
litigation, the number of defendants per case averaged twenty. DEBORAH R. 
HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS 15 
(1985). 
 9. See, e.g., Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(plaintiff exposed to three different defendant’s products for 20, 15, and 8 years). 
 10. See, e.g., John Crane, Inc. v. Linkus, 988 A.2d 511(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2010); In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 617 (Tex. 1998). 
 11. Compare Richard A. Lemen, Chrysotile Asbestos as a Cause of Mesothelioma: 
Application of the Hill Causation Model, 10 J. OCCUP. ENVTL. HEALTH 233, 233 (2004) 
with J.C. McDonald & A.D. McDonald, Chrysotile, Tremolite and Carcinogenicity, 41 
ANN. OCCUP. HYG. 699, 699 (1997); see Nolan v. Weil-McLain, 851 N.E.2d 281, 284–
85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 12. [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572. 
 13. These problems are explained in Michael D. Green, A Future for Asbestos 
Apportionment?, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 315 (2006).  To be sure, there is a serious 
causation problem with one of those diseases, lung cancer, when an asbestos 
5
Green: Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal Ball
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
998 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
been resolved reasonably satisfactorily, initially with the decision in 
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,14 and later in Rutherford v. 
Owens-Illinois, Inc.15  Borel, the seminal case imposing liability on 
asbestos defendants held that the jury could find all defendants 
responsible for exposing the plaintiff to asbestos jointly and 
severally liable and thereby affirmed the plaintiff’s judgment.16  
Rutherford, which occurred later in the life cycle of asbestos 
litigation, employed risk contribution by asbestos defendants and 
whether the risk was a substantial factor in causing harm, thereby 
eliminating the concern that the proportional liability adopted in 
England and the Netherlands addresses. 
Larry Stewart who had a front-row seat in the process that of 
preparing the Third Restatement as a member of the advisory 
committee and a member of the ALI council explores another 
controversial aspect of the Third Restatement.  The Third 
Restatement attempts to bring a measure of coherence and clarity 
to the issue of duty,17 which has been used as an instrument for a 
variety of purposes, many of them opaque to the reader of court 
opinions addressing the matter of duty.  Stewart carefully explains 
that effort for those who are unfamiliar with its contours.  Stewart 
then proceeds to explain what he would have had the Third 
Restatement do in the duty realm that it did not. 
The Third Restatement insists that duty must be categorical, 
must ignore foreseeability, and must not be decided solely based on 
facts specific to the case.  At the same time, it recognizes and 
approves of withdrawals or modifications of the presumptive duty 
of reasonable care on grounds of policy or principle, remaining 
agnostic about the grounds adopted by courts for those withdrawals 
or modifications.  Stewart argues for rejecting social norms as a 
valid ground for modifying the presumptive duty.  Some will 
 
victim was also a smoker, but it has not been a significant obstacle for most such 
claimants. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 illus. 2–3 (2010). 
 14. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 15. 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 27 cmt. g reporters’ note (2010) (“Since the first asbestos case in which a 
plaintiff was successful [referring to Borel], courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover 
from all defendants to whose asbestos products the plaintiff was exposed.”). 
 17. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) 
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 712–17 (2001) 
(explaining the multiple uses and misuses of duty by courts). 
6
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sympathize with this claim.  But if normative judgments about the 
grounds for limited and no-duty rules are placed on the Third 
Restatement process agenda, I fear many conflagrations in the 
process that may make the controversy over the reasonable 
alternative design requirement in the Products Liability 
Restatement look like a love feast.18 
Professor Geoffrey Rapp’s contribution to this Issue 
underscores that the treatment of causation in the first two torts 
restatements was sorely in need of repair.  It was no secret in torts 
circles that causation was a weak link in those volumes and led 
courts into a great deal of mischief, confused thinking, and virtually 
nonsensical gibberish about causation.19  This presented both a 
challenge and opportunity for the ALI in repairing what the earlier 
restatements wrought.  As Professor Rapp observes in his 
conclusion, only with the passage of time will assessment of the 
success of the Third Restatement be possible. 
Jeff Ehrich and Mike Steenson engage in the hard labor of 
trying to reconcile the Third Restatement with a specific state’s 
torts jurisprudence.  As the Colloquium that preceded this Issue 
and corresponding Symposium dramatically revealed, approaches 
to tort law can vary substantially even between neighbors such as 
Iowa and Minnesota.  Does the Third Restatement have something 
to offer all states, regardless of their history and approach to tort 
law? 
Ehrich examines Minnesota law on negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  He rightly recognizes that in that arena, 
Minnesota law is stagnant and has failed to keep up with 
developments since the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) 
(“Second Restatement”), which contained no provision for liability 
for negligently inflicted emotional harm.  Ehrich’s survey of other 
states’ treatments of this area reveals the significant, if halting and 
multi-variegated, developments in this area of law. 
Ehrich’s assessment of the unsatisfactory state of Minnesota 
law with regard to stand-alone emotional harm is convincing.  
 
 18. Compare, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design 
Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV. 1 (1999), with, e.g., Andrew 
F. Popper, Restatement Third Goes to Court, 35 TRIAL 54 (Apr. 1999). 
 19. Courts frequently speak about superseding causes severing the causal 
chain between defendant’s tortious act and plaintiff’s harm, a usage that Judge 
Posner has characterized as “legal mumbo jumbo.”  Shadday v. Omni Hotels 
Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir.  2007). 
7
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Nevertheless, he proceeds beyond criticism to attempt to provide a 
useful framework for the future.  Working with parameters 
suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s cases, Ehrich 
provides a framework for a future in which liability for negligently 
inflicted emotional harm is appropriately limited to a defined and 
objective class of activities and relationships that avoid the concerns 
that have led courts to be more cautious about this type of harm 
than they are with physical harm. 
One final note about Ehrich’s roundup of emotional harm 
jurisprudence.  He notes that the Maine Supreme Court, in a 
leading emotional harm case, rejected the eggshell plaintiff rule: 
“We do not provide compensation for the hurt feelings of the 
supersensitive plaintiff—the eggshell psyche.  A defendant is bound 
to foresee psychic harm only when such [severe] harm reasonably 
could be expected to befall the ordinarily sensitive person.”20 
It may be that Maine has abolished the thin-skull rule for 
emotional harm cases.  But, we will only know that when a sensitive 
plaintiff is exposed to negligent conduct that would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer severe harm.  If the sensitive person 
suffers greater harm than would an ordinary person and the Maine 
Supreme Court holds that plaintiff can only recover damages for 
harm that the ordinary individual would, then we can accurately say 
that the thin-skull rule was abolished.  But Gammon only tells us that 
there is a threshold of severity of harm that all plaintiffs must meet 
not whether we take such plaintiffs as we find them for purposes of 
awarding damages.21 
Professor Steenson addresses the Third Restatement and its 
compatibility with Minnesota tort law, an area in which he is an 
acknowledged expert.  Steenson provides a careful and concise 
summary of the basic principles of the Third Restatement, as well 
its reception in a handful of courts that have already confronted its 
provisions and decided whether and how much of it they want to 
adopt for their own state’s torts jurisprudence.  
Steenson then parses Minnesota negligence law dating back 
over a century, documenting the subtle twists and turns in that 
caselaw.  When the Supreme Court says that foreseeability is most 
often for the jury but “can be decided by the court as a matter of 
 
 20. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 
1987). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
47 cmt. i (Tent. Draft No. 5, 2008). 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/8
  
2011] INTRODUCTION 1001 
law,”22 does the court mean nothing more than the standard rule 
for removing a factual question from the jury: reasonable minds 
could reach only one conclusion?23  Or does it mean something 
else, as surely its decision in Szyplinski v. Midwest Mobile Home Supply 
Co.,24 suggests, with its stated position that “generally the better rule 
is to submit the issue of foreseeability to the jury”?  It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that the lower courts in Minnesota reflect 
inconsistency and confusion, as Steenson documents.  My strong 
suspicion is that this inconsistency reflects other aspects of the cases 
that are obscured by the use of foreseeability and pingponging it 
between judge and jury.  That opacity is one of the evils that the 
Third Restatement sought to ameliorate by removing foreseeability 
from the duty determination.25 
Steenson’s survey of Minnesota doctrine on factual cause and 
scope of liability (proximate cause) is a clarion call for creating an 
impenetrable barrier between the two.  Minnesota cause law not 
only repeatedly confuses the two, but criticizes the test for cause in 
fact for failing to handle scope of liability issues—a little like 
blaming President Obama for the muddle that exists in tort law in 
Minnesota.  The court that first developed the substantial factor 
test for a specific and narrow problem of factual causation,26 now 
has elevated it to duty for which it is not and never was suited—
substantial factor ignores the fact that an act is or is not a cause of a 
dichotomous outcome.  Causation of an injury or disease is not a 
matter of degree,27 and the substantial factor standard provides no 
analytical framework for deciding causation.28  I do not envy the 
judges on the court of appeals who have to deal, on a regular basis, 
 
 22. Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Minn. 2009). 
 23. Canada v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 506 (Minn. 1997). 
 24. 241 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn. 1976). 
 25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
7 cmt. j reporters’ note (2010). 
 26. Specifically the over-determined outcome.  See  Anderson v. Minneapolis, 
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
(2010). 
 27. ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN 
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 132 (1961) (“we cannot see that there is 
any justification for distinguishing among causes on the strength of quantity”); J.L. 
MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 128 (1980) (“if two 
factors are each necessary in the circumstances, they are equally necessary”). 
 28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. j reporters’ note (2010). 
9
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with the conflicting and confusing case law that Steenson lays out. 
David Logan does, among other things, the important work of 
highlighting an often misunderstood issue: What is a restatement? 
Logan explains the tension that has always existed in the ALI’s 
work between a pure “restatement” and “reforming” law that may 
be outdated, inappropriate, or conflicting.  The dictum with which 
I began this Introduction is an artful and wise, if general 
articulation of the philosophy of the ALI in its work that hangs just 
to the right of reporters attending ALI meetings.  “Restatement” is 
a bit misleading, and there are many who it has misled. 
But there are other aspects to the restating process that 
deserve mention.  First, when the law is so muddled that it is the 
equivalent of legal mumbo jumbo, providing no cognitively 
coherent standard, but one that is, however, well ensconced, 
should a restatement take it upon itself to reform that law?29  And, 
if it does, what role should restating take?  Second, recognizing the 
tension between restating and reforming, how ambitious should a 
restatement be?  Every reporter for every restatement confronts this 
question nearly every day in the process of preparing a draft 
restatement, and the extensive ALI process guarantees that the 
reporter’s decision will be repeatedly reviewed.  Logan explains 
how this second issue was resolved in the chapter on land possessor 
duties.  Only modestly, in the major aspect of the chapter, which 
adopts what has become the majority (but only barely) rule30 
imposing a duty of reasonable care to those categorized as invitees 
 
 29. An example of what I am referring to is the language frequently used in 
instructions on causation, explaining that a cause is that which “in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient intervening cause, produces the 
result.”  Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ind. 2004); see also Dellwo v. 
Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 861–62 (Minn. 1961).  What is a “natural sequence” and 
how is it distinguished from an “unnatural” one?  Are there discontinuous 
sequences between a cause and its effect?  What inefficient causes exist?  And how 
will we know the difference from their efficient namesakes?  Somehow nonsensical 
language like this has withstood the test of time in too many jurisdictions. 
 30. Not only is the “majority rule” of significance, if not conclusive, in 
restating, the trend of decisions is important as well.  Restatements are prepared at 
a given point in time, and the common law is constantly evolving.  In the case of 
land possessor duties, the virtually unanimous trend since Rowland v. Christian, in 
1968, was to adopt a unitary standard, even if it took forty years before a majority 
was reached, by my count, with the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Koenig 
v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635 (Iowa 2009).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. a repoters’ note (Tentative Draft No. 6, 
Mar. 2, 2009) (stating that of forty-eight states that can be classified, twenty-four 
had adopted a unitary duty for invitees and licensees). 
10
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and licensee. 
But much more significantly with regard to trespassers, as 
Logan carefully documents.  While the Second Restatement made 
numerous distinctions among trespassers, separating out child 
trespassers, constant trespassers, and known trespassers for special 
treatment, the Third Restatement makes only one distinction 
among trespassers.  They are either flagrant trespassers or ordinary 
trespasser with different duties owed to each.  One could search 
fifty-one jurisdictions, as Logan explains, and not find a single 
flagrant-trespasser rule.  
Logan assesses the flagrant trespasser concept in the crucible 
in which it was formed—the ALI process for drafting, reviewing 
and approving its work.  Comparing that process with both 
common-law and democratic decision making, Logan concludes:  
Ultimately the level of influence accorded a restatement 
rule will be determined in the rough and tumble of 
litigation in coming years.  In this sense, the ALI’s work, 
though antidemocratic in origin, will be tested and stand 
or fall, in the marketplace of ideas.31  
The ALI has both succeeded and failed when it has attempted 
reform.32  I agree with Dean Logan that we shall have to wait and 
see which side of the scorecard the flagrant trespasser idea should 
be assigned, but, as I suggest below, there is a surrogate issue that 
will probably have to suffice for judging the flagrant trespasser 
idea.33 
Professor Christie addresses the same topic as Dean Logan, 
albeit with greater discomfort.  He expresses concern that 
trespassers are truly different from other entrants on land in that 
their presence is less likely to be anticipated.  That fact might give 
others concerns about imposing the same duty on land possessors 
for trespassers (save flagrant trespassers) as for other entrants.   
Perhaps I can ameliorate those concerns.  First, some risks on 
land require durable precautions, rather than transient ones.34  
Thus, if one stores toxic chemicals on one’s property, durable 
 
 31. David Logan, When the Restatement is Not a Restatement: The Curious Case of 
the “Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448 (2011). 
 32. One such unsuccessful attempt of which I was acutely aware was the effort 
to inject the concept of “legal cause” into tort law. The Third Restatement 
abandons that effort for reasons explained in § 26 cmt. a and § 29 cmt. g. 
 33. See text accompanying infra notes 39–40. 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
51 cmt. h (forthcoming 2012). 
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precautions are likely required to adequately contain those 
chemicals—transient precautions such as oral warnings are unlikely 
to be sufficient.  Thus, transient precautions are the ones of 
concern to Christie in that they are dependent on the foreseeability 
of an entrant’s presence and exposure to the risk.  The seminal 
case of Rowland v. Christian,35 llustrates.  Rowland involved a latent 
defect on a faucet knob—repairs were a matter for the landlord 
rather than the tenant-defendant.  The only precaution available to 
her was a warning, alerting her guest to the danger so that he could 
avoid it. 
But suppose that Rowland had been a trespasser.  To facilitate 
the point, let us also assume that Rowland was not a flagrant 
trespasser.  So, let’s make him a repair person who mistakenly 
entered Christian’s apartment when he was supposed to go to an 
adjacent apartment.  While in Christian’s unit, he used the 
bathroom and sliced his hand on the faucet, just as Rowland did in 
the actual case. 
In my assessment, our hypothetical plaintiff would lose in his 
tort suit against Christian.  And he would lose as a matter of law, 
without reaching a jury.  The reason addresses the concern raised 
by Christie, but resolves it in a different fashion from that which he 
suggests: with no foreseeable risk to an entrant, Christian has not 
acted negligently.  More precisely, no reasonable jury could find 
that she acted negligently.  More generally, foreseeability is always 
on the table when it comes to negligence or breach of the duty of 
reasonable care.36  More importantly, this decision is based on the 
specific facts of this hypothetical case.  To repeat one of the most 
important points in the Third Restatement, foreseeability can only 
be assessed based on the specific facts of a case, not categorically.  
Foreseeability, thus, is a matter for breach not for duty, which is 
and should be categorical.37 
Professor Christie also expresses concern that the land 
possessor chapter of the Third Restatement may fail in the 
Institute’s founding purpose to bring consistency and clarity to the 
common law.  By failing to provide a bright-line rule to distinguish 
flagrant trespassers from ordinary ones, this provision may produce 
 
 35. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). 
 36. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 3 cmt. g, 7 cmt. j (2010). 
 37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7 cmt. j (2010). 
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disparate and inconsistent decisions.  Perhaps, but if that happened 
because, say, Texas holds real property ownership more dear and 
uninvited entrants more culpable because of the vast array of 
landholdings in that state than, say, Massachusetts, where the safety 
of individuals who live in more tightly confined environments is an 
important principle, that would be precisely what the Third 
Restatement envisions.38  Differences in state law because of 
differences in the states should not be troublesome to the ALI in its 
work.39 
I don’t, however, think that we will face different 
determinations about which trespassers are flagrant.  Indeed, 
contrary to Professor Christie’s prophesy that future decisions on 
flagrant trespassers will be disappointing, I don’t expect that there 
will be much, if any, case law development about which trespassers 
are flagrant.  In fact, I would not be surprised if, in the next several 
decades, there is not a single case addressing the flagrant trespasser 
concept. 
The reason for this bold prediction is straightforward.  What 
plaintiffs’ lawyer would accept and bring a case on behalf of a 
person who entered land to commit a crime or otherwise 
proverbially to rub the owner’s nose in the entrant’s uninvited and 
unwanted presence?  Any witted plaintiff’s lawyer would realize 
that, regardless of the law, no jury would find in such a plaintiff’s 
favor.  The paucity of cases in which a trespasser who might be 
characterized as flagrant in the years since Rowland v. Christian has 
made an appearance,40 while short of conclusive proof, supports my 
 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
51 cmt. a (forthcoming 2012). 
 39.  Thus, § 21 of the Third Restatement recognizes different approaches to 
strict liability for livestock that cause damage to another’s property. Some 
jurisdictions temper the strict liability by providing a defense when others failed to 
build a fence to keep livestock out (“fencing out”) while other states do not 
provide such a defense, thereby requiring that ranchers keep their livestock 
confined (“fencing in). Generally, fencing out is employed when farmers are in 
the minority and ranchers are in the majority, thereby permitting free ranging for 
livestock. By contrast, in states where farmers are in the majority and ranchers in 
the minority, fencing in, which minimizes the burden of fencing, is employed. 
 40. The flagrant trespasser concept is based on a California statute enacted in 
the aftermath of Rowland that exempts land possessors from liability to entrants 
who are committing any one of twenty-five specified criminal acts unless the 
possessor acts willfully, wantonly, or criminally.  The restatement reports on the 
invocation of this statute in the years since it was enacted: 
In the twenty-two years between the time the California statute was 
enacted and this reporters’ note was prepared, it has been invoked 
13
Green: Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal Ball
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
1006 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
thesis that the flagrant trespasser concept is not going to produce 
chaos in the law applicable to land possessors tort obligations. 
A more appropriate test for the flagrant trespasser concept is 
whether it gives comfort to those states that decide to reform their 
land possessor law by moving from categorical duties to a unitary 
duty regime.  Among those two dozen jurisdictions that still retain 
rules developed during feudal times, will some include trespassers 
among those owed a duty of reasonable care if and when they 
reform their laws?  A number of states that adopted a unitary duty 
of reasonable care for invitees and licensees declined to extend 
that duty to trespassers, expressing concern about the hypothetical 
“flagrant” trespasser.41  Thus, I suggest that the success of the 
flagrant trespasser provision in the Third Restatement be measured 
not by the consistency it brings to what I expect will be a non-
existent body of case law, but by its role in educating courts to 
appreciate that trespassers are not all created equal and some—
those that are not flagrant—should be treated as other entrants are 
with reasonable care taken for their safety. 
Steve Gold, with his characteristic perspicacity, takes on the 
issue of causation in toxic substances litigation, a subject that he 
has been addressing since his student note twenty-five years ago.42  
Gold is not very happy with the current state of affairs in this world, 
and he looks to the potential for the Third Restatement to 
ameliorate his concerns.  Gold thus focuses attention on one of the 
most controversial provisions in the Third Restatement, its 
treatment of proof of causation in the toxic arena contained in 
 
exceedingly rarely.  In neither of the two reported cases citing section 
847 was an arguably flagrant trespasser seeking to impose a duty of 
reasonable care on a land possessor. . . . Nor has the reporters’ research 
revealed any land possessor cases in which the other statutes cited above 
limiting a criminal plaintiff’s ability to recover in tort have been invoked. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. a 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 41. See, e.g., Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd. P’ship, 707 A.2d 15 (Conn. 1998) 
(McDonald, J., concurring) (“A burglar inherently endangers himself or herself 
and others when committing an offense. . . .  Landowners simply should  not be 
required to keep their property safe for burglars else they be held liable for 
negligence.”); Sandoe v. Lefta Assocs., 551 A.2d 76 (D.C. 1988); Schofield v. 
Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1982); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 
1972) (“Burglars are trespassers; vandals are trespassers. We have criminal statutes 
governing trespassers.”); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, C.J., 
concurring); Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. 2004). 
 42. Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of 
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). 
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comment c to section 28. 
Gold takes as his starting point the preponderance of the 
evidence standard on causation.  He notes that this standard 
implies a balancing of errors between plaintiffs and defendants 
reflecting a judgment that errors on behalf of plaintiffs (false 
positives) are equally costly as errors on behalf of defendants (false 
negatives).  Gold finds in the current landscape of toxic torts a bias 
in favor of false negatives and against false positives, a false negative 
asymmetry, as he puts it, that troubles him.  Causation standards in 
toxic tort cases should not be more stringent than in other, run-of-
the-mill tort cases: “[T]he definition of causation is the same, the 
burden of persuasion is the same, and the scrutiny of evidence 
proffered to satisfy the burden should be the same.”43  I think he is 
absolutely right. I also agree that there is a bias in operation, 
although I am less convinced that it is as pronounced as he 
believes. In short, courts have always screened out cases in which 
the evidence of causation was thin, albeit under a different rubric 
than the current Daubert regime. 
Gold’s assessment suggests that he would prefer a world in 
which all or nearly all cases would be submitted to the factfinder 
for a determination based on a preponderance of the available 
evidence of causation.44  I have sympathy for this view as well.  Long 
ago, in response to some of the evidentiary thresholds imposed by 
courts that Gold identifies and criticizes, I wrote:  
Toxic causation must be assessed with due regard for the 
available evidence.  Where the epidemiologic record is 
substantial, reliable, and consistent, the saliency of animal 
studies or other evidence of toxicity is quite low.  However, 
when epidemiologic evidence is lacking, thin, of questionable 
validity and ultimately inconclusive, dismissing other 
toxicological evidence is unjustifiable.  The point is that 
plaintiffs should be required to prove causation by a 
preponderance of the available evidence, not by some 
 
 43. Steve Gold, The “Reshapement” of the False Negative Asymmetry in Toxic Tort 
Causation, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1561, n.269 (2011). 
 44. This may not be a fair reading.  Gold acknowledges the role for the 
burden of production in separating out cases in which a reasonable inference of 
causation may be drawn from the evidence as contrasted from those in which 
speculation alone would be the basis for such a finding.  He also appears to 
endorse portions of comment c that approve of insufficiency of the evidence 
dismissals.  Gold, supra note 42, n.282. 
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predetermined standard that may require nonexistent studies.45  
I am not nearly as sanguine about what I wrote almost twenty 
years ago today, and I take this opportunity to revise my position.  
Partly as the result of some sage and critical questioning by Joe 
Sanders, who shares my fascination with causation in this context, 
and partly as the result of expanded horizons and reflection, I now 
appreciate much more acutely the role of the burden of 
production and its impact in these cases.  I also appreciate that the 
use of the burden of production to screen plaintiffs’ claims is not 
peculiar to toxic substance litigation.46 
The burden of production has always burdened the plaintiff 
when evidence of a prima facie element of a case is scarce.  And it 
does so without regard to the merits of the case.  As Gold puts it, it 
produces only false negatives, the asymmetry that concerns him.  
Yes, this is undesirable, but the alternative of shifting the burden 
full scale to defendants is worse.  It is worse because of the difficulty 
of proving a negative.  Indeed, if we were to shift the burden of 
proof to defendants in toxic tort cases, plaintiffs would win every 
birth defects case on causation because the majority of birth defects 
are of unknown origin.47  That means that a defendant would be 
unable to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that its agent 
didn’t cause plaintiff’s birth defect.  Defendants could never prove 
that their agents aren’t capable of causing harm—i.e., are entirely 
safe—at least through epidemiology because all that negative 
 
 45. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic 
Substances Litigation: the Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 643, 680 (1992). 
 46. As I read Gold, he suggests otherwise.  He writes, “Scientific uncertainty 
of a type not usually seen in other tort cases poses recognized unique obstacles to 
proof of toxic tort causation.”  Gold, supra note 43, at 1510, n.13.  Gold is probably 
correct that toxic tort cases as a whole suffer from a greater incidence of 
uncertainty due to thin evidence of causation than other cases—I put aside any 
impact of a differential selection effect between these two classes of cases by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.  But the problem of limited evidence is by no means unique 
to this genre, as I explain in the text.  And while he is correct that general 
causation is exceedingly rarely invoked in routine traumatic-injury torts that is 
because general causation is almost always satisfied in those cases because the 
biologic mechanism of crushed skulls or broken bones from blunt impact is well 
understood.  But sufficient evidence of specific causation, even if not 
denominated as such, is, with some frequency, a stumbling block for all torts 
plaintiffs. 
 47. See Robert L. Brent, Environmental Causes of Human Congenital 
Malformations: The Pediatrician’s Role in Dealing with These Complex Clinical Problems 
Caused by a Multiplicity of Environmental and Genetic Factors, 113 PEDIATRICS 957, 958 
(2004). 
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epidemiology is able to do is limit the extent of risk that might 
exist.  Not only unable to disprove general causation, defendant 
could not disprove specific causation because the majority of birth 
defects cannot be attributed to a cause that a defendant might 
refute.  In short, the false positives with a shifted burden of proof 
would dwarf the false negatives that the current system imposes. 
Thus, imposing the burden of production means that courts 
will screen out a number of cases in which there is merit but the 
evidence is just too thin to permit an acceptable degree of 
confidence in the outcome.  This is the familiar distinction 
between a reasonable inference, which means that there is a 
sufficient base of evidence in favor of the proposition, and mere 
speculation, which is the universal appellation when the evidence 
simply doesn’t measure up.  To put the point slightly differently, as 
more evidence that favors a proposition emerges, the range of 
inferences by each member of a population evaluating that 
evidence will narrow.  If asked the likelihood it rained at some 
prior time in a remote location, the range of responses by those 
asked is likely to be wide.  As evidence is provided—the number of 
days per year that it rains in that location, the humidity at the 
relevant time, the degree of cloud cover, etc.—those assessments 
will narrow.  Before courts let cases go to a jury, exercising their 
role in ruling on the burden of production, the evidence must 
narrow the range of inference to an indescribable and sometimes 
shifting degree, but narrow it must.  No judge would submit a case 
to the jury if the issue were whether it rained at a given time with 
the only evidence being that there were some (unidentified type) 
clouds in the sky at the time.48  Similarly, no judge would submit to 
a jury a case of a victim suffering a rare form of cancer in which the 
plaintiff’s only evidence was a couple of case reports of patients 
who suffered the same common disease as plaintiff after exposure 
to the same agent. 
The conventional tort example of insufficient evidence to 
permit an inference of causation is Wolf v. Kaufman.49  Plaintiff’s 
 
 48. Yes, I need to exclude from this statement rain forests and deserts. But 
these examples support my point—with evidence that the location is a rain forest 
or desert, the range of assessments by a population will narrow. 
 49. 237 N.Y.S. 550 (App. Div. 1929).  But see Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 
37 La. Ann. 694 (La. 1885) (similar factual situation to Wolf; court concludes jury 
verdict on behalf of plaintiff is proper because the defendant’s negligence “greatly 
multiplied” the risk of an accident, and the possibility that accident would have 
happened in the absence of defendant’s negligence is too speculative). 
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decedent fell on stairs that were unlighted due to the defendant’s 
negligence and died as a result.  The Wolf court held that the 
evidence—limited to the fact of the fall on the unlit stairs—failed 
to satisfy the burden of production because “it would be solely a 
conjecture for a jury to draw the conclusion that the deceased fell 
down the stairs because of the absence of light.”50  The modern 
version of Wolf is Butts v. Weisz.51  Just as in Wolf, plaintiff’s decedent 
fell down a dimly lit staircase.  And just as in Wolf, there was no 
other evidence about why the decedent fell.  But revealing the 
connection between conventional tort litigation and the modern 
Daubert, expert-screening era, the court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling excluding plaintiff’s expert opinion that the dim lighting 
and a dangerous step were the cause of the fall.  
Of course, the line that courts draw between reasonable 
inference and impermissible speculation is a varying one. The same 
court that decided Wolf with the same judge authoring the opinion 
decided a similar case nineteen years later in contrary fashion.52  
Gold is, in my view right, in his claim that many courts in the 
current toxic substances era have drawn the line too far toward 
ruling that plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient, as the Comment in 
the Third Restatement that he discusses explains. Just as with 
flagrant trespassers, only time will tell whether, as Gold hopes, 
comment c makes a difference in how courts deal with the 
difficulties of proof in toxic causation cases.53  
Given the interesting issues revealed by the array of articles in 
this Issue and corresponding Symposium, I suggest we all revisit 
this Issue in a decade or two when the evidence improves such that 




 50. Id. at 550. 
 51. Nos. 10-1643, 10-1644 (3d Cir. Dec. 28, 2010). 
 52. See Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo, 14 N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1938) (Finch, 
J.) (holding that it was for jury to decide whether, on the one hand, decedent fell 
down stairs due to a heart attack or dizziness while carrying thirty-two-pound box 
or whether, on the other, decedent fell on second-to-last step, which was found 
broken and had been negligently maintained by defendant, and injuries from fall 
caused his death).  
 53.  One early return supporting Gold’s aspirations for comment c is Milward 
v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. 2011). One of the 
most significant toxic tort causation cases in recent memory, Milward takes a 
significant first step toward fulfilling the promise that Gold finds in comment c. 
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